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Just after the full moon had set early on 27 October 1857, Abor-
igines entered a darkened homestead on the Dawson River, Central 
Queensland, and killed ah the men, except one who was knocked 
unconscious and left for dead. Then they induced the women and 
children outside and, after some dehberation, raped the three eldest and 
killed them ah. 
The station family's name was Fraser and the tribe blamed for the 
attack was later known as the Jiman. The place was Hornet Bank sheep 
station, 30 miles west of Taroom. Among the 11 white victims were 
three employees - a tutor, and two shepherds. The eldest son of the 
family, WilHam Fraser, had left some time previously with drays for 
Ipswich, 320 miles away. His 14-year-old brother, Sylvester, who had 
been knocked unconscious, soon recovered but lay hidden under his 
bed, listening as his mother and sisters were abused and slaughtered. 
Then, after the intruders had left about sunrise, Sylvester escaped to a 
neighbouring station and raised the alarm. In the retribution by the 
Native Mounted Police and settlers of the Upper Dawson and other 
districts, at least 150 Aborigines died; the total may have been 300. The 
long-term effect on the Jiman was the destruction of their society; the 
long-term effect on the Fraser brothers, William and Sylvester, was 
one of unremitting failure as colonists, and yet their story has become 
Queensland legend. Their revenge against the Jiman, without pros-
ecution, helped to set the pattern for white attitudes and colonial 
government policy towards the Aborigines of Queensland for the next 
40 years. 
The basic facts of the Hornet Bank massacre are fairly well known, 
although recent research has shown that previous accounts have ah 
been inaccurate in at least some detail and some popular accounts have 
been grossly inaccurate even in fundamental points. It is not intended 
here to reconstruct the massacre and events leading up to it, because 
Mr. Reid, a student at the Australian National University, Canberra, has researched the 
inter-relation of these massacres as part of his thesis for a Master degree this year. 
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they are dealt with separately.' Instead, this paper will trace the move-
ments of Aboriginal bands after the attack on Hornet Bank in order to 
show that at least one band appears to have participated in the massacre 
of the Wills party at Cullin-la-Ringo station on the Nogoa River, four 
years later. It will be shown that the two surviving Fraser brothers, 
William and Sylvester, participated in the white revenge after the latter 
outrage. Also, the lessons which can be learnt from a study of the two 
massacres will be discussed. 
The first contact made by any whites with the attackers occurred 
late on the day following the massacre, when Second-Lieutenant 
Walter Powell, who had taken charge of the Upper Dawson detach-
ment of the Native Police after the suspension of Second-Lieutenant 
Thomas Ross in September, heard of the attack. His troopers soon 
picked up tracks leading westwards from Hornet Bank. Having 
assumed that Sylvester was dead, the Aborigines in this band apparently 
believed that they were in no immediate danger. Before sunset on 28 
October they camped in an open space near a gorge through which the 
Dawson River flows about 10 miles west of Hornet Bank. Once inside 
the gorge they could expect to be safe. As they were preparing to settle 
down for the night, the Native PoHce attacked, killing five and 
wounding several others. The remainder fled into the scrub and prob-
ably into the gorge. The Police retrieved about 100 sheep which the 
band had taken from Hornet Bank station and some European 
weapons. But over the next 10 days Powell did not again make contact 
with Aborigines.^ 
Two points are significant in Powell's report: that he encountered a 
band moving westwards and that this was the only one in 10 days. It is 
not clear where else he searched in that time, but if he stayed in the 
rugged country to the west of Hornet Bank, it is almost certain this 
band was the only one which moved westwards after the attackers, 
believed to have numbered about 100, dispersed. An Aboriginal band 
normally comprises between 20 and 30 persons, including old men, 
women and children; this means that in a band of as many as 30 prob-
ably no more than 10 fighting men would be available. This in turn 
suggests about 10 bands were involved in the attack. Where did the 
other nine go? The available evidence suggests they moved south-
wards, south-eastwards, eastwards and also northwards along the 
Dawson River. 
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The Scott family at Hornet Bank station in the 1880s. The main house at the 
time of the massacre is the second from the right, the one on the right not 
having been built at that time. The kitchen and the tutor's room were in the 
small building third from the right. (Oxley Lib. photo). 
A Dulacca squatter, John Ferrett, believed that the Hornet Bank 
attackers came from his district. They had frequented the poHce 
barracks at Wondai Gumbul near Dulacca and had become daring in 
the presence of the Native PoHce because of the mismanagement of 
the officers there.^ If Ferrett was correct, then the Mandandanji of the 
area between Miles and Roma appear to have participated in the Fraser 
murders. 
WiHiam Fraser returned to the Upper Dawson on 12 November and 
was with Powell when his detachment attacked Aborigines collected 
near Taroom station, now Carrabah station, east of Hornet Bank on 27 
November. Three Aboriginal men and three women were killed and 
the remainder dispersed.'* Second-Lieutenant Robert Walker joined 
forces with them in an attack on another group of Aborigines at 
Juandah station (near Wandoan) a few days later. Seven Aborigines 
were killed there, although C. J. Royds of Juandah station later said that 
these Aborigines were not involved in the Hornet Bank outrage.^ 
Fraser, Powell and Walker were then involved in the killing of 11 
other Aborigines possibly near Cockatoo station, farther to the east.'' 
Fraser claimed to have identified possessions taken from Hornet Bank 
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and to have recognised some of the Aborigines as persons always in the 
neighbourhood of that station. 
One of the bands which attacked Hornet Bank was believed to have 
come from the Baking Board district, just west of Chinchilla, and to 
have returned there. This band left a track along a creek leading 
towards Redbank station on the Auburn River, but then doubled back 
towards Baking Board to the south. The police following them were 
misled. They arrived at Redbank, discovered a band of Aborigines 
encamped near the station, and despite the protests of the Ross family, 
rounded them up, took them away and killed most.'' 
SETTLERS CLOSE T O PANIC 
Settlers in the Auburn and Burnett districts were becoming alarmed 
by the number of Upper Dawson Aborigines who were appearing in 
their districts. William Wiseman, the Commissioner of Crown Lands in 
the Leichhardt district, reported on 8 December that the more-than-
ordinary activity of the squatters and Native Police in pursuing them 
had forced them "inwards" towards the settled districts, where they 
would "lie about in security till a more favourable period".* Phillip 
Lamb of Rocky Springs on the Auburn wrote on 3 December to his 
brother in Sydney that the blacks in his district were harbouring the 
Dawson tribe who had been committing atrocities equalled only by 
those of the Sepoys in India.' It was strongly rumoured that the 
Dawson blacks would attack another station soon. 
Squatters in the Upper Dawson were now in a state near to panic. 
George Pearce Serocold of Cockatoo Creek station claimed that if no 
active measures were immediately adopted by the Government there 
would be a squatters' crusade as soon as the shearing was finished. In 
one year, he pointed out, 20 people had been murdered on the Upper 
Dawson, the population of which did not exceed 180 whites."* Early in 
December the crusade began. A party of several squatters from Bunga-
ban and Cockatoo stations in the Upper Dawson, and from Dykehead, 
Auburn and Hawkwood stations on the Auburn assembled at Hawk-
wood and, with some of their employees and two Moreton Bay Abor-
igines as trackers, set out to destroy groups of Aborigines before they 
could attack again. 
During six weeks these vigilantes dispersed several camps of Abor-
igines along the Auburn and eastwards across the Burnett district. They 
found personal effects of the Erasers in at least one of the camps. It was 
estimated later that they kiHed 80 Aborigines, who they claim.ed were 
Dawson blacks, identifiable because of a distinctive boomerang-shaped 
marking on their chests." This action forced the Upper Dawson Abor-
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igines even farther eastwards. Some were seen as far east as C. R Haly's 
Taabinga station on the Burnett and Witheron station 15 miles east of 
Gayndah.'^ 
The deep penetration of the Auburn and Burnett districts by the 
Upper Dawson people (commonly called the Jiman, although this 
name is not convincingly established) shows that they had strong 
cultural relations with the tribes of these areas. Linguistic research by 
John Mathew early this century and by Nils M. Holmer only recently 
shows that there was a linguistic grouping of tribes dominated by the 
Kabi Kabi of the Wide Bay district and the Wakka Wakka of the 
Burnett.'^ On the evidence of band movements after the Hornet Bank 
attack it appears that the Upper Dawson people were part of the 
Wakka Wakka western division of this linguistic grouping, which may 
also have included the Mandandanji of the Condamine around Dulacca, 
the Barunggam of the Chinchilla-Dalby district, the Goreng Goreng of 
the Northern Burnett and possibly the WuHH of the Middle Dawson. 
If this is so, then we know who attacked Hornet Bank. It was a confed-
eration of tribes, which some time before had decided to make a 
concerted attack on a station selected for several reasons, including its 
isolation and vulnerability. The objective was to begin a campaign of 
terror which would drive the whites out of the frontier districts. 
There remains one other movement of the attackers away from 
Hornet Bank to consider - that is, northwards along the Dawson. Soon 
after the Fraser murders. Aborigines gathered at Joseph Thompson's 
Camboon station (near Theodore) but were dispersed by Second-
Lieutenant Robert Walker on his way from Rockhampton to the 
Upper Dawson. Sub-Lieutenant F. W. Carr, who had been stationed on 
the Lower Dawson at the time of the attack, brought up his detach-
ment from Banana station, arriving on 2 December at RawbeHe station 
50 miles east of the Dawson and about the same distance north of 
Redbank. The squatter, Berry, was in great dread of attack from Abor-
igines encamped nearby. Carr's detachment dispersed them, kihing 
three.''' 
In January 1858, 200 to 300 Aborigines unsuccessfully attempted to 
ambush Wiseman and his party at night on the road from Rannes 
station to the Archers' Gracemere station (near Rockhampton). Wise-
man claimed that a great many of this party had come from the Upper 
Dawson and very probably many were implicated in the massacre of 
the Fraser family and had moved northwards to escape from the 
Native PoHce and whites pursuing them there. N o Fitzroy River blacks 
were with them, he said, as they spoke an entirely different tongue 
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from ah those near Rannes. This group had been on Rannes run just 
before Christmas, killing sheep and robbing shepherds' huts. Six 
months after the Hornet Bank massacre, the Dawson was still not 
"quiet"; two Chinese and two Englishmen being killed on Camboon 
station in April 1858. The attackers then went to Banana station, where 
they attacked three white men who fought them off In July 1858 50 
to 60 Aborigines attacked Henry Gregory's Gwambagwyne station 
north of Taroom. The police followed them for six days northwards 
before losing them.'^ The guerilla war continued for about 18 months 
as the frontier moved northwards and westwards away from Hornet 
Bank, to which some sort of peace and accommodation with the 
events of 27 October 1857 came at last. 
In the four years after the Hornet Bank massacre, the Aboriginal 
people of the Upper Dawson had either moved out of the area or had 
succumbed to conquest and become "station blacks" as they were "let 
in" to the stations now estabHshed in their homelands. Some who had 
not capitulated had moved northwards along the Dawson and appear to 
have been there still during the first half of 1861, in the area between 
the Dawson, Mackenzie and Comet Rivers. 
BREAKING T H E HOSTILE LINE 
Squatters in search of new runs had been moving into this district 
after breaking through the forbidding Dawson line of hostile tribes and 
brigalow scrubs. One of the earliest runs in this district was Bauhinia 
Downs, occupied by Charles and Henry Dutton. From the outset they 
had had good relations with the local tribe, among whom now in 1861 
lived some people from the Upper Da^wson. The Duttons' kindness was 
noted by Oscar De Satge, whose brother Henry was at this time on the 
neighbouring Albinia Downs station on the Comet. The Duttons, De 
Satge said, were friends of the Aborigines and "warm protectors from 
anything like cruelty and injustice"."' The Duttons, however, were 
almost alone among the whites in this new district in holding these 
sentiments, their only support coming from Frederick Walker, the 
former Native Police Commandant, then living at Nulalbin near the 
junction of the Dawson and Fitzroy Rivers. 
The Queensland Attorney-General, Ratcliffe Pring, had made a 
strong speech in the Legislative Assembly, declaring that it was the 
duty of the magistrates to protect the Aborigines as much as the Euro-
peans in the colony. This had inspired Walker to write to Pring asking: 
". . . of what use are such truisms, when it is notorious that they are 
ignored in practice?" He alleged that a "native of the Colony of Vic-
toria" named Tahiti, who had faithfuHy served the Government for 
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eight years, had been murdered and after a delay of 10 months, the 
Government having ordered an inquiry, William Wiseman, a magis-
trate, had instituted a "mock enquiry" and "did his utmost to screen the 
murderers". Walker objected to Aborigines being treated as aliens in 
their own lands. It appears his attitude was that although the whites had 
a right to conquer the Aborigines, the Aborigines, as the original 
inhabitants, also had rights which should be recognised and honoured 
by the Government.''' 
Incidents involving the Duttons and the Native PoHce demonstrate 
the great potential for further disaster still remaining on the Central 
Queensland frontier. After the shearing on Albinia Downs had been 
completed in the summer of 1860-61, Aborigines on the station had 
left it; but a month later about 30 strangers, heavily armed and 
unaccompanied by their women, appeared at the kitchen door at 
sunrise and demanded of a white woman that she give them a sheep 
hanging there. Second-Lieutenant A.M.G. Patrick, then staying with his 
troopers at Albinia Downs, ordered them away. Later he and his 
troopers went to the two out-stations to check them and encountered 
about 70 warriors. It was reported that Patrick had ordered them to go 
further from the head-station but they had attacked the police.'^ 
Charles Dutton wrote to Morisset about the behaviour of Patrick, 
who claimed he was "quietly riding along" when he was attacked. 
Dutton alleged the circumstances were such as to require an investiga-
tion. Further, he said, since Patrick had returned from the Comet he 
had made his camp about two miles from Bauhinia Downs and this had 
led to more trouble with the local Aborigines. In accordance with 
Morisset's wishes in the past, the Aborigines had been moved from 
Bauhinia Downs, but when the police had left the district to go to 
Albinia Downs and the Comet, Dutton had invited the Aborigines to 
return so they could receive some tomahawks he had promised them. 
The drays with the tomahawks had not arrived, but Dutton permitted 
the Aborigines to wait." 
On Sunday 17 March, Patrick arrived with his troopers and asked 
Dutton whether he had aHowed the Aborigines up to his place. When 
Dutton replied affirmatively, Patrick asked "in a dictatorial tone" 
whether he intended to turn them out when the drays came. Dutton 
replied he did. Patrick then went to the camp about 100 yards from the 
house. Some of the blacks were frightened and asked Dutton to inter-
vene. More words were exchanged between Patrick and Dutton, and 
when Dutton declared he would use his discretion as to whether he 
would turn out the Aborigines, Patrick, "in a state of maniacal excite-
ment", ordered his troopers to unsling their carbines and drive them 
out. Two or three of the troopers obeyed, but those Aborigines who 
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could run were out of sight in the nearby scrub in a moment. Patrick 
gathered such spears and waddies as he could find, saying his orders 
were to disperse armed mobs. This "armed mob" consisted of eight 
able-bodied men and 17 women, children and cripples.^" 
In his letter to Morisset, Dutton said: "Here were a smaH lot of 
peaceable blacks who came in at my request to receive a gift of toma-
hawks and blankets, were rushed out of their camp by the police, 
threatened with shooting if they dared to stand, their implements of 
chase carried off and destroyed . . .". Dutton found Patrick's actions 
repugnant. "These creatures", he warned, "wretched and debased and 
brutal as they are, have still one feeling in common with whi tes . . . that 
of deep implacable revenge for unprovoked injury."^' 
Apparently Patrick had little control over his men. When criticised 
because of their indifference to his orders, he remarked it •would not 
do to check them too often as they would give him deadly looks and 
were ugly customers to deal with. In Dutton's opinion, Patrick had 
done his best to inflame the district. He was apprehensive about the 
consequences of Patrick's heavy-handed methods towards the Abor-
igines, informing Morisset that ". . . the occurence on the Comet is 
fearfully dangerous to all." Patrick's actions had perhaps created an "evil 
that no principle of justice, no intelligence, no severity can suppress".^^ 
Frederick Walker later said he knew of only one case in which a 
magistrate had successfuHy resisted the slaughter of "the unoffending 
Blacks"; this was Charles Dutton of Bauhinia Downs. Walker also said 
that Henry Dutton had threatened the Native Police officer involved 
with a revolver. Henry Dutton had "made use of the only argument 
that could have succeeded and saved the station from being poHuted by 
another crime".^^ 
" H U M A N E " DEALINGS WITH TRIBES 
Morisset considered Patrick, who had been appointed to the Force 
on 12 August 1860, to be not very promising but very steady. He 
thought that Patrick would be a "humane" man in his dealings with the 
natives.^'' Patrick's "humanity" towards the Aborigines appears to have 
been of the type displayed by the more severe officers of the Native 
Police. Early in 1861 he had complained to Charles Dutton that other 
officers had been able to bag their first Aborigine after only a few 
weeks in the Force; he had served for six months and stiH had not yet 
killed a black.^^ The Aborigines near Bauhinia often asked Dutton why 
they were shot at? They said they had not killed whitefellows nor 
killed sheep nor taken rations. There was no answer, Dutton told 
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Morisset, except that the Aborigines were black and must be shot.^' 
In April 1861 Henry De Satge at Albinia Downs wrote to Morisset 
saying Dutton had exaggerated Patrick's actions on the Comet.^' But 
Frederick Walker also complained of Patrick's behaviour. In a letter to 
the Colonial Secretary in April 1861, he said that that officer had 
dispersed friendly Aborigines on Planet Creek, a tributary of the 
Comet River, at the beginning of March 1861. Also, Patrick had 
attacked, killed and wounded several others on Rolleston's station on 
the Comet. These latter Aborigines had been assisting a Mr. Sutton on 
the latter's run after his white servants had left him. Walker had heard 
of this attack on 4 March. He said the whole tribe was greatly excited 
and accused him and all Europeans of treachery. Since then a worse 
outrage had been committed at Charles Dutton's station. Walker caHed 
for the protection of these Aborigines in future or the result might be 
a collision between the settlers and the Native Police.^^ 
Walker's complaint was referred to Lieutenant O'Connell Bligh, 
who replied from Rockhampton on 21 May that he had just returned 
from a tour of the Comet River and had received Patrick's report, 
which said some Aborigines without gins and fuHy armed had come to 
Rolleston's station on the Comet and demanded sheep. Realising the 
Native PoHce were there, they had gone away, foHowed by Patrick 
with the stated intention of preventing any outrage at the shepherds' 
huts. Coming upon a large number, he was attacked and compeHed to 
fire in self-defence. Bligh said the neighbouring squatters, except 
Dutton, were not apprehensive about the consequences of Patrick's 
action.^' By mid-1861 Patrick's relations with his own troopers were so 
bad that they deserted on Zamia Creek in the same area.^" 
No official action was taken on Dutton's complaint. He waited until 
the report of the 1861 Select Committee was released before writing 
again, this time to the Colonial Secretary, stating that he had been 
denied the opportunity to give evidence before the Select Committee. 
Also, he alleged that a most unjustifiable insinuation against his moral 
character had been made by a member of the Government. His letter 
implies that member was R. R Mackenzie. AH he wanted, he said, was 
to clear his name and to "secure to the Blacks in future a recognition of 
their rights as human beings, which the whole conduct of the Native 
Police has ignored".^' 
WILLS' P A R T Y O N T H E N O G O A 
Dutton's warnings of future trouble were in vain. As he was writing 
his letter of 10 September, Horatio Spenser Wills, a wealthy squatter 
from the Wimmera District of Victoria who had little knowledge of 
northern frontier conditions, was bringing a large party of employees 
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and their families northwards to establish a new run on the Nogoa 
River, 55 miles north-west of Albinia Downs. Several other runs had 
already been established near the Nogoa including Rainworth, 
occupied in June that year by Jesse Gregson. After stopping at Albinia 
Downs, Wills early in October reached his new run, CuHin-la-Ringo, 
just over 20 miles north of Rainworth, in the land of the Kairi people. 
Wills intended to treat them with kindness and friendship and allowed 
them to approach his camp while his employees went about establish-
ing the station. If he had been told of an incident involving Patrick, 
Gregson and the Kairi of the district before he arrived, he apparently 
placed no importance upon it. 
Gregson had sailed from England in 1855 and worked for Dr. Trail 
at Collaroy station near CasiHs in the western New England district, 
first as a station hand and then as overseer. The neighbouring station 
was held by A. and V. Busby, who had selected Rainworth, and Greg-
son was engaged to establish this new station. Gregson started from 
CasiHs in May 1860, overlanding 5000 ewes and reaching Albinia 
Downs early next year. On 24 June 1861 he camped for the first time 
on Rainworth, named after a nearby hill in turn named by Augustus 
Gregory during an exploring expedition. As soon as Gregson's drays 
reached the camp he gave the Kairi to understand that they must keep 
clear, which "they did good-humouredly enough". They had been 
burning grass by the creek but, on being asked to beat out the flames, 
they did so.^ ^ 
About a fortnight after Gregson's arrival, a detachment of the 
Native Police under Patrick arrived and camped near his party. On the 
foUowing morning Gregson found that some of his sheep were strag-
gling into camp and realised that they must have been "dropped" by a 
shepherd. Three hundred were missing. With Patrick and his troopers, 
Gregson and his men began to search and soon found the sheep in the 
charge of a band of Aborigines who, he said, were driving them into a 
patch of thorny scrub on a steep stony point of a ridge. 
Dismounting, we went up the ridge on foot to dislodge them 
and a brush took place. Subsequently Mr. Patrick told me that I 
had shot him in the leg, and true enough a bullet from my 
revolver had reached him, though as I was in advance it could 
only have done so by glancing from one of the rocks. He 
remained with me for some days and then left for Rockhampton 
where I beHeve the bullet was extracted.^^ 
A few years later a young Aboriginal stockman gave a different 
account of the incident to Tom WiHs, a son of Horatio Wills, while 
riding together on Cullin-la-Ringo. The stockman said that when 
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Map showing the geographical locations of Hornet Bank and 
Cullin-la-Ringo. 
some of the local people found Gregson's sheep wandering they 
assumed the whites had "thrown them away" and felt free to help 
themselves. They took the sheep back to their camp where they killed 
some and were preparing for a feast when Gregson arrived with the 
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police. Believing that they had done nothing wrong, they took no 
defensive action and ahowed the police to approach. Without explana-
tion, the poHce and Gregson charged the camp, firing as they came. 
Nonetheless the Aborigines held their ground. In the melee that 
foHowed, some troopers were dragged from their horses and Gregson 
accidentaHy shot Patrick in the leg, forcing the police to retire. The 
Kairi also retired, taking with them into the bush two wounded who 
soon died. According to the stockman, a conference was held and a 
decision taken to seek revenge. Runners were sent over the neigh-
bouring countryside, and Aborigines answered the call, some coming 
from great distances. They congregated at Separation Creek, the 
boundary between Rainworth and Cullin-la-Ringo, so many that, 
according to the stockman, they were everywhere like ants. He 
explained that the local tribe had not been able to distinguish between 
Gregson and Wills: they dressed alike and rode about together and so 
the Aborigines assumed the two men were brothers and therefore one 
was as responsible for the injustice done to them as the other.^'' 
Tom Wills had gone from Cullin-la-Ringo with two men to pick 
up some loading which had been left at Albinia Downs on the way 
northwards. On the night of 16 October 1861 the moon was at the 
full. The weather had been very warm. In the heat of the next morn-
ing about 60 Aborigines casually entered the Wills camp and watched 
proceedings; they showed no hostility and soon left. By lunch time the 
whole camp was fatigued and, after a meal, most of the whites were 
having a siesta. Some distance away under a tree, a shepherd, John 
Moore, dozed with his sbeep. Now Aborigines just as casually returned 
and infiltrated the camp. Taking up positions, they struck so quickly 
that most whites died without a fight. Wills managed to fire one shot 
from a revolver; his overseer. Baker, and two men putting up a yard a 
mile-and-a-half away fought hard for their lives with tent-poles. The 
shepherd, John Moore, hearing the uproar, was able to crawl away 
among a flock of sheep until he was out of sight; then he ran to Rain-
worth. Two other shepherds farther from the scene also escaped the 
When Moore arrived at Rainworth next morning, Gregson was 
shearing. At once Gregson organised a party and set out for Cullin-la-
Ringo, arriving late that night with nine shearers. "The bodies of men, 
women and children were lying in positions and attitudes which 
showed, as the shepherds had supposed, they had all been kiHed on the 
instant without any struggle on the part of the men." The two other 
shepherds, Edward Kenny and Patrick Mahoney, had now appeared. In 
no case, Gregson found, had the victims been mutilated. He said that 22 
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or 23 were killed,^ '* but the actual death toH was 19 in the worst 
massacre of whites in Australian history. 
"PURSUED A N D P U N I S H E D " 
When Tom WiHs returned, Gregson left him in charge at Cullin-la-
Ringo and, getting together a party of neighbours including Patten, 
Thomson, Macintosh and Richards and their employees, set out in 
pursuit. They came upon a camp of hundreds at daybreak. The result-
ing clash was inconclusive, the whites being forced to retreat when the 
Aborigines realised they had left their horses to approach the camp.^' 
As soon as the massacre had been reported, police magistrate John 
Jardine despatched Sub-Lieutenant William Cave and troopers leading 
remounts and carrying 300 ball cartridges with instructions to rendez-
vous with the white party who numbered 10. They carried rations for 
six weeks.^* Oscar De Satge, who heard of the massacre from Richards' 
son a few days after it happened, says that after Cave arrived with the 
Native Police "the murderers of the Wills party were thoroughly 
pursued and punished for their misdeeds".^' 
Tom Wills stayed on at Cullin-la-Ringo as station manager, return-
ing to Victoria in 1864. He had lost only his father in the massacre, the 
other members of the family not yet having made the journey north-
wards. He seems to have borne no ill-will towards Aborigines. A first-
class cricketer, he was appointed coach of the Aboriginal cricket team 
at Edenhope in the Wimmera district and captained the Aboriginal 
team which played against a white team at Melbourne Cricket Ground 
on Boxing Day 1866 and then at other Victorian centres before play-
ing in Sydney and a few N.S.W. provincial centres in 1867. He was a 
heavy drinker, and D. J. Mulvaney writes that: "Alcohol ruined his 
career and led to his tragic suicide in 1880.'""* 
On his arrival at the police barracks in the Upper Dawson on 7 
November 1861, BHgh, now Native Police Commandant, received 
confirmation of the massacre. He had heard a rumour of it on the 
Maranoa and had brought with him Second-Lieutenant William 
Moorhead and six troopers, whom he proposed to take to the Nogoa 
where they would be deployed for the additional protection of the 
frontier. He moved George Murray, younger brother of John Murray 
who had recently been dismissed from the force, from the Upper 
Dawson to the acting command of the First Division at Rockhampton, 
leaving the Upper Dawson unprotected until Moorhead could be 
recalled after two months on the Nogoa. Commenting on Cullin-la-
Ringo, Bligh said that such a wholesale massacre could not have taken 
place if the blacks had been kept out of the station altogether. As it was, 
he said. 
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they saw the defenceless condition of the whites (so great was the 
late unfortunate gentleman's confidence in the Blacks that not 
one of his numerous firearms was served out to his men, or even 
unpacked from the case in which they reached the station) and 
took the first opportunity after maturing their plans, of kihing 
the whole of them. 
It is a well-known fact among the Squatters on this River that no 
murders were committed at any station where the Blacks were 
entirely kept out. Upon these precedents, I have instructed 
Second-Lieutenant Moorhead and the officer with him not to 
allow any Blacks to remain at the Stations in their District, but to 
send them away without violence if possible, that is to say except 
in self-defence. 
BHgh anticipated considerable opposition from the Duttons and 
Frederick Walker, but being convinced that no other course would 
secure the safety of life and property, he trusted that he might receive 
the support of the Government in carrying out the system.*" There 
were other opponents at this time; the "church party" was protesting 
against the Queensland Government's methods of keeping the depre-
dations of the Aborigines in check."^ This party comprised certian 
clergymen and a few philanthropic squatters. 
Some writers have claimed the Wills party murders led to "the 
greatest punitive expedition in pioneering history . . . Hundreds of 
blacks were slaughtered.'"'^ This may be true, but it is not clear from 
the sources; nor is it fully clear what official and unofficial forces 
carried out this punishment. 
In his despatch to London on the massacre, Governor Bowen said 
about 100 "fighting men" took part. Subsequently "an uncontrolled 
desire for revenge took possession of each heart". Thirty Aborigines 
were said to have been killed by a party of 11 whites. Then Sub-
Lieutenant Cave, who had been sent 200 miles to the scene with 
troopers, pursued the Aborigines for four days. When he came upon 
them, several were killed and the remainder retreated to a hill, the 
front of which was almost perpendicular. Some fell from the top in 
their attempts to escape the police. Bowen remarked that an estimated 
70 Aborigines had been kiHed in retaliation for the Cullin-la-Ringo 
Apart from Bligh's intention to send Moorhead to the Nogoa for 
two months, there is no further official mention of his movements 
there. According to an official history of the Native Police, George 
Murray, known as "Black Murray" because of his flowing black beard, 
arrived at the police camp at Rainworth with a detachment of troopers 
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on 26 October, only nine days after the massacre. His force "shot a 
large number of aboriginals and recovered firearms and other property 
which had been stolen from Cullin-la-Ringo".''^ 
George Murray made a much more successful career in law-
enforcement than his brother John. George Pulteney Malcolm Murray 
was born in Dunfriesshire, Scotland, in 1837, went with his parents 
when five years of age to New South Wales, moved to Moreton Bay 
when 17 and joined the Native Police as a sub-lieutenant when 20. He 
was in the Upper Dawson district as early as July 1858, and in 1860 was 
the officer-in-charge of the barracks at Robinson's Creek and so would 
have been well-known to the Erasers. James Nisbet, who also knew 
him there, described him as an "excellent, judicious officer who 
throughout his long and varied services in the North won and 
deserved the respect and esteem of those with whom he came in 
contact." Nisbet added: "Without his (and others') services in the early 
days it would have been almost impossible for the settlers to have 
remained on their holdings in that country.'"** Murray was described as 
"active and untiring, always in the saddle; without exercising needless 
severity, he showed the blacks that in the most rugged of their haunts 
his men could foHow and surprise them."'" He was credited with 
"going to Springsure and soon made this area as safe as the DarHng 
Downs".*** 
EVIDENCE OF I N V O L V E M E N T 
There is some reason to believe that the Jiman and the Fraser 
brothers were involved in the Cullin-la-Ringo massacre and its after-
math. It was alleged early this century that the Jiman took part, accord-
ing to C L. D. Hamilton who got his information from Jimmy Reid of 
Camboon, a member of "a mid-Dawson tribe" adjoining the Jiman.'" 
Camboon is in the tribal area of the WuluH, according to Tindale's 
map. His information is supported by a contemporary evidence from I. 
Downes Wood. In his letter to the Queensland Chief Secretary in 
March 1862, Wood remarks that he had heard that certain of the ring-
leaders at Hornet Bank, who had escaped the Native Police, were at the 
Nogoa massacre. He said they were last heard of at Charley's Creek 
near "Jingi''.^ "* Wood was referring to Charley's Creek which flows 
through Chinchilla to the Condamine River and to Jinghi Jinghi, a 
small centre 30 miles east of Chinchilla. This claim, if true, confirms a 
connection between Hornet Bank and Cullin-la-Ringo. Also, it shows 
that the Aboriginal people involved in Hornet Bank ranged over great 
distances and that one group at least came from the area between the 
Condamine and the Great Divide and between a point just west of 
Chinchilla to at least 30 miles east. 
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The only documentary evidence of the Fraser brothers' involvement 
in the Cullin-la-Ringo aftermath comes from the story of Benjamin 
Rayner, who died aged 79 at Hodgson near Roma on 2 October 1917. 
Born at Ellisborough near Aylesbury, England in 1838, Rayner arrived 
in Moreton Bay in 1856 and went to Ipswich where he worked for 
some time before going with sheep to Dulacca and then droving to the 
Edwards River, southern N.S.W. Eventually he returned to Ipswich 
where he was engaged by R. Spencer to go with cattle to Denison 
Creek, a tributary of the Isaacs River at the back of Mackay. An article 
written by "Ben Bolt", based on Rayner's diary and published in the 
Australian Pastoralist Grazing Farmers' and Selectors' Gazette in 1927, 
continues the story: 
There was the usual number of men, and the party included a 
young couple named Ready, who were travelling some part of 
the way with Mr. Wills, who was going out with a staff of men, 
women and children to found CulHn-la-Ringo station on the 
Comet. Mr. Wills thought that with kindness and patience he 
could placate the blacks, who were beginning to become very 
troublesome at the time the parties parted company. The sorrow-
ful sequel told a different tale. One morning an old man 
staggered into the camp and all that could be got out of him was 
'all dead'. Ben's camp mustered all hands and sent for help. Arriv-
ing at CulHn-la-Ringo, a gruesome sight met their gaze - seven-
teen men, women and children lay there, butchered by the 
blood-thirsty black murderers. The party determined to show no 
mercy, and they didn't. Among the members of the punitive 
force were the Fraser brothers, the only two survivors of the 
Hornet Bank massacre of 1859 [sic], who had a bitter score to 
wipe out. Superintendent Perry, with a posse of black trackers 
then arrived, and if they did not help in the 'dispersal', they held 
the telescope to the wrong eye while the Erasers got even.^' 
This evidence is reasonably plausible, despite small factual errors. At 
the time of Cullin-la-Ringo, Rayner was close to the Erasers, who 
were then on Grosvenor Downs station on the Isaacs, William having 
selected the run in June 1860. Getting up a revenge party on the Isaacs 
and riding to the Nogoa almost immediately after the massacre was 
possible. The distance was only about 130 miles and the Frasers had 
already shown that they could manage such a ride in a day. That such 
parties did travel from far afield to Cullin-la-Ringo is corroborated by 
James Nisbet, who was a member of one which rode from Ghinghinda 
station in the Upper Dawson and arrived in time to "clean up" after the 
massacre.^^ Ghinghinda is about the same distance as Grosvenor Downs 
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from Cullin-la-Ringo. "Superintendent Perry" is apparently a reference 
to George Murray, who reached a senior rank in the Native PoHce 
before becoming a police magistrate. The article does not actually say 
that Rayner was a member of the party which went to Cullin-la-
Ringo from the Isaacs, but even if he did not he would have heard, 
when the party returned, of the Erasers' participation. 
The overall evidence is thin, but it does appear that there were at 
least these two connections between Hornet Bank and Cullin-la-
Ringo. There is no doubt that some of the attackers of Hornet Bank 
moved either voluntarily or compulsorily northwards along the 
Dawson - the evidence of Wiseman and Carr demonstrates that. It is 
possible also that the later activities of the Native Police, particularly 
those involving Second-Lieutenant Patrick in 1861, forced at least 
some of these Upper Dawson people westwards towards first the 
Comet and then the Nogoa Rivers. The provocation suffered by the 
Aborigines in the Comet and Nogoa districts culminated in the attack 
by Patrick and Gregson on or near Rainworth station against supposed 
sheep-stealers. The massacre of the Wills party on the Nogoa was the 
inevitable expression of black justice. 
George Murray was back in Rockhampton when William Cave, 
now a second-lieutenant, wrote to him from the Comet and Nogoa 
River barracks on 28 October 1862. Cave reported that apart from one 
smaH incident near the junction of Springsure Creek with the Comet, 
in which he "was compelled to fire on them, to disperse them", he had 
seen few Aborigines during his recent patrol of the district. Most, if not 
all, of the Aborigines fired upon belonged to the eastern side of the 
Expedition Range, which means they came from the mid-Dawson. On 
searching their camp he found unmistakeable signs that they had 
participated in some outrage, as he found many things taken from 
whites, such as a pair of girths, a pair of scissors and other sundry 
articles, all of which he destroyed. GeneraHy, however, the district was 
quiet.^^ 
Wood had another comment on Hornet Bank which should be 
noted. He pointed out that because the women at Cullin-la-Ringo 
were not raped and those at Hornet Bank were, it appeared the reason 
for the attack on Hornet Bank was revenge for sexual transgressions by 
the whites there." This is an over-simplification, the reasons for the 
Hornet Bank attack being complex, but it shows that Wood was using 
his knowledge of tribal justice to ascertain the cause of an Aboriginal 
"outrage". He may have been the first European in Australia to have 
related forensic evidence to tribal law in order to understand the cause 
of a particular black and white conflict. 
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Like Wood, we can use Cullin-la-Ringo to draw conclusions about 
Hornet Bank. Firstly, the whites had learnt nothing from the lesson of 
the first disaster; the official policy of dispersal of Aborigines who 
resisted white incursions into their hunting grounds continued 
unchecked, and after Queensland's separation from New South Wales 
was strengthened by official sanction. Secondly, the "innocent" victims 
at the second disaster were no more innocent than those of the first; 
the Aboriginal justice system required that aU members of a family 
were equaHy responsible for the crimes of an individual member; 
therefore, even if the Frasers had done the Jiman no injustice, they 
were just as culpable as the Wills party for the crimes of the whites and 
the colonial government. Thirdly, after both massacres, terrible 
revenge was exacted on the supposed murderers by the whites on a 
scale which borders on genocide; at least one tribe was decimated and 
doomed to extinction. 
The road from Hornet Bank to Cullin-la-Ringo had been long and 
roundabout, and at the end the whites learned nothing about black and 
white relationships. For them, the second disaster merely confirmed 
popular beliefs that the Aborigines were savage and treacherous; they 
did not seem to understand that attacking a band of Aborigines who 
had taken charge of a few sheep which they thought the whites had 
"thrown away" was just as savage and treacherous. In those days, devas-
tating punishment seemed to be the ready answer to most problems 
which the whites had in their relations with the Aborigines. For the 
Aborigines there was only one choice: submit to conquest or fight. At 
Hornet Bank and CulHn-la-Ringo they tried to commit outrages so 
horrifying that the whites would withdraw from their land. But the 
"greed for land" which Oscar de Satge had noted then was too strong 
to deter the whites.^^ The frontier moved northwards and westwards 
and there were more conflicts, so many that Henry Reynolds has 
estimated that at least 5000 and possibly 15,000 Aborigines died in the 
period 1840 to 1890.="* The road from Hornet Bank to Cullin-la-Ringo 
led on to the Palmer River in the 1870's and the Selwyn Ranges in the 
1880's, then to the government reserves, created after the Aborigines 
Protection and Restriction on the Sale of Opium Act 1897 as the final 
solution to these problems. If that road leads anywhere today, perhaps 
it leads us back through the same country from the Macintyre north-
wards, but hopefully we have different attitudes now and a greater 
readiness to learn the lessons along the way. 
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